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The grand jury plays a significant role in the federal criminal justice
system. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees indictment by grand jury in all felony cases.' That guarantee reflects
the framers' perception that the grand jury provided protection against
improper indictment and acted as a protective buffer between the execu-
tive and the individual. Over time, however, the character and signifi-
cance of the grand jury has changed.2 The role of the grand jury is
neither one-dimensional nor well-defined. It is clear that the grand jury's
role has two aspects. The grand jury originally was conceived of as a
shield, but now also functions as a sword.3 The framers of the Bill of
Rights envisioned the grand jury's role as a shield against improper in-
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., Radcliffe College; J.D., Uni-
versity of Maine; LL.M., University of Michigan. I thank my colleague Leonard Packel for his kind
assistance. I also extend special thanks to my tireless research assistants, Kevin M. Flannery and
Louise E. Schmoyer.
1. Amendment V of the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See generally M. FRANEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON
TRIAL (1977); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973);
Johnston, The Grand Jury-ProsecutorialAbuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMI-
NOLOGY 157 (1974); Knudsen, Pretrial Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L.
REV. 423 (1973); Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of
the Prosecutor?, 2 N.M.L. Rav. 141 (1972); Note, Grand Jury Proceedings The Prosecutor, the Trial
Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1972). A thorough discussion of the history
of the grand jury is beyond the scope of this Article.
3. See generally 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1:07 (1986);
Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political
Activists, 75 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159 (1984); Rodis, A Lawyer's Guide to Grand Jury
Abuse, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 123 (1978); Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand
Jury Indictment-A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (1984) [herein-
after Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers]; Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and
Problems, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 681 (1973); Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of
Political Dissidents, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432 (1972); Powers of Federal Grand Juries, 4 STAN.
L. REV. 68 (1951). See also 7 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE MANUAL (Prentice-Hall) § 9-11.020 (1990)
(reflecting dual role).
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dictment. Whether it can any longer act effectively as a buffer has been
questioned again and again.4 The grand jury now offers a valuable tool
for the investigation of criminal cases. It plays a significant role as the
prosecutor's weapon. In fact, the grand jury has been criticized as hav-
ing become nothing but a powerful and easily abused weapon of the pros-
ecution.5 Both aspects of the grand jury's role require procedural
responses to avoid abuse. As this Article demonstrates, the Supreme
Court has done little to address that need.
The modem grand jury is controlled to a large extent by the prosecu-
tor. The prosecutor's special access to the grand jury is a source of tre-
mendous power. That power can easily be subject to abuse. Both
commentators and litigators have called attention to misuse of the grand
jury.6 Documented improprieties as well as allegations of abuse in the
grand jury occur regularly. The range of abusive behavior is broad.
Some types of misconduct undermine the grand jury's function as a
shield, risking unwarranted indictment. Some types of misconduct abuse
the grand jury's power as a prosecutorial sword.7 Thus, grand jury abuse
4. The most comprehensive discussion of this issue is found in Professor Arenella's 1980 arti-
cle. Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Con-
viction Vithout Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1980).
5. See generally Campbell, supra note 2, at 178-79; Deutsch, supra note 3; Johnston, supra
note 2; Note, supra note 2, at 1183. But see Sullivan & Nachman, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It.
Why the Grand Jury's Accusatory Function Should Not Be Changed, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1047, 1049 (1984) ("Although overzealous or overreaching federal prosecutors can manipulate the
federal grand jury, by and large the Department of Justice has not abused its authority").
6. See generally 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 3, §§ 10:01-17; Deutsch, supra note 3;
Johnston, supra note 2; Rodis, supra note 3; Shannon, supra note 2; Note, The Exercise of Supervl.
sory Powers, supra note 3; Note, supra note 2.
7. See generally Rodis, supra note 3; Vaira, The Role of the Prosecutor Inside the Grand Jury
Room: Where is the Foul Line?, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1129 (1984); Note, Mechanikal
Applications of the Harmless Error Rule In Cases of Prosecutorial Grand Jury Misconduct, 1988
DUKE L.J. 1242, 1265 n.136 (listing abuses).
Misconduct that undermines the shield function includes presenting false or misleading evidence,
failing to present exculpatory evidence, and making improper comments to urge the grand jury to
indict. Misconduct that abuses the sword function of the grand jury includes using the grand jury to
harass witnesses, subjects of grand jury investigation, or associates of those in political disfavor, and
using the grand jury to obtain an advantage in civil or criminal litigation.
Interestingly, the risk of harm inflicted through investigation-misuse in the sword capacity-
rather than indictment-undermining the shield function-may require the greatest judicial supervi-
sion. Many states have eliminated the requirement that criminal prosecution be initiated by indict-
ment rather than information, yet retain the grand jury as an investigative body available to assist
the prosecution. This trend reflects a perception that the value of the grand jury as a shield against
unwarranted indictment is not great.
Critics of the grand jury have called for its abolition on the ground that it is not an effective shield
and that the fiction of a protective grand jury passing on probable cause should not be continued.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss4/5
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threatens not only criminal defendants but also witnesses and unindicted
subjects. Without judicial supervision, the prosecutors' sense of appro-
priate behavior is the only check on such abuse. Ongoing judicial super-
vision of the grand jury is essential to curtail these abuses as much as
possible.
Some lower federal courts have responded to grand jury abuse by in-
voking their supervisory authority over the grand jury to check and rem-
edy some of the improper prosecutorial conduct.' Unfortunately, those
courts represent the minority position. The majority of courts have been
unreceptive to appeals to their supervisory authority. The courts fear
that greater supervision will generate collateral proceedings and provide
the opportunity for disruptive delaying tactics. Consequently, they have
erected barriers to effective judicial review of claims of abuse. First, the
courts have imposed difficult evidentiary burdens on those seeking reme-
dies for grand jury abuse. Second, the courts have limited the remedies
for grand jury abuse. Third, the courts have made it difficult to obtain
appellate review of lower court rulings on claims of grand jury abuse.
Many allegations of abuse of the grand jury therefore receive no serious
consideration in the legal system, and prosecutors are given little incen-
tive to avoid abusive practices before the grand jury.
Unfortunately, in three recent decisions, the United States Supreme
Court has even further curtailed judicial supervision of the grand jury
process. In United States v. Mechanik,9 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States,10 and Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States," the Court rejected
pleas for protection against abuse of the grand jury. The procedural
Instead, critics argue, the defendant should receive a preliminary hearing, in which the evidence is
presented in the defendant's presence and the existence of probable cause is determined by a neutral
judicial officer.
Yet the grand jury has been retained for special cases even in jurisdictions where criminal charges
are routinely brought by means of information. The grand jury is retained because it offers tremen-
dous investigative advantages to the prosecution; it serves as a powerful prosecutorial sword. This
suggests that the greatest risk generated from misconduct lies in the investigative phase of the grand
jury, not in its indictment decisions. Identifying and remedying abuse in the investigation, however,
can be extremely difficult.
8. For examples of the courts' exercise of supervisory authority, see Arenella, supra note 4, at
489, 512-2 1; Note, supra note 7, at 1246; Supreme Court Review, Supervisory Power Meets the Harm-
less Error Rule in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 79 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1037, 1041
nn.32-33 (1988); Comment, Confusion in the Grand Jury: A New Standard for Dismissal Based on
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 55 BRoOKLYN L. REv. 249 (1989).
9. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
10. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
11. 109 S. Ct. 1494 (1989).
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rules prescribed in the three cases impede defendants' access to judicial
review of claims of grand jury abuse. These cases also restrict the courts'
supervisory authority and the use of dismissal of the indictment as a judi-
cial response to misconduct in the grand jury process.
The first part of this Article reviews prior Supreme Court decisions
and analyzes the three recent decisions to determine the precise extent to
which they limit judicial supervision of the grand jury. The second part
of the Article assesses the utility of the available mechanisms for enforc-
ing procedural protections in the grand jury. This Article identifies the
remedies available as enforcement mechanisms in the grand jury and
considers the effectiveness of those remedies. The Article then examines
whether the grand jury's shield function is still viable.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE GRAND JURY
The Supreme Court has only rarely turned its attention to matters of
grand jury abuse. The Court has examined requests for disclosure of
grand jury material and has interpreted the relevant procedural rule.
The Court has also entertained a number of claims of privilege raised by
witnesses before the grand jury. But prior to its action in Mechanik,
Bank of Nova Scotia, and Midland Asphalt, the Court rarely considered
the extent of the federal courts' supervisory authority over the grand
jury, reviewed any claims of patterns of grand jury abuse, explored the
legality of the available remedies for grand jury violations, or considered
whether the courts have any role in assuring that a grand jury indictment
is not based on unreliable evidence.12 The Supreme Court simply refused
to grant certiorari in cases raising questions of the courts' authority over
the grand jury. Consequently, the supervision of the grand jury process
was largely carried out by the lower courts, and the law was defined in
lower court opinions. Some lower courts, as well as a number of com-
mentators, advocated a stronger supervisory role."3 In a number of cases,
abuse of the grand jury by the prosecutors was acknowledged and
remedied."'
12. See generally Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers, supra note 3, at 1084-88 (discussing
the Supreme Court's reluctance to sustain challenges to the validity of the indictment).
13. See generally Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers, supra note 3, at 1089-90; Johnston,
supra note 2, at 162-63; Supreme Court Review, supra note 8, at 1041-42; Note, supra note 2; Note,
The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems, supra note 3, at 703-04.
14. See, eg., Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investi-




WHO WATCHES THE GUARDIAN?
A. Prior Case Law
The assertion of supervisory authority by the lower courts occurred
against a back-drop of adverse Supreme Court authority. When deciding
issues bearing on grand jury procedure, the Court assumed that some
level of supervision existed. However, the Court never explicitly author-
ized supervision of the grand jury. The Court enforced the rules promul-
gated by Congress to regulate the grand jury, but took a hands-off
attitude whenever it was asked to impose supervisory regulation. The
Court has consistently declined to approve judicial supervision that
might generate collateral proceedings or allow defense manipulation of
the process.
The Court has done little to ensure the responsible use of the grand
jury as a sword. For example, the Court declined to intervene to protect
grand jury witnesses. Grand jury witnesses seeking protection from pro-
cedural irregularities before the grand jury received no protection unless
the claim rested on a recognized privilege. For example, a witness may
raise a claim of privilege to avoid self-incrimination or to shield protected
confidences. However, a witness has no standing to challenge the grand
jury's authority on other grounds. In Blair v. United States,15 the Court,
describing the grand jury as a "grand inquest,"16 held that a witness sub-
poenaed before the grand jury had no standing to challenge the investiga-
tion. In United States v. Calandra,17 the Court held that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in the grand jury. The
Court determined that the interference with the grand jury's traditional
function was too great and the likely gain in deterrence of fourth amend-
ment violations was too small. I Only in Gelbard v. United States,19 did
the Court hold that a witness before the grand jury cannot be compelled
to answer questions based on information obtained through illegal elec-
tronic surveillance or wiretapping. In Gelbard, the Court was compelled
to its holding by specific statutory authority precluding the use of the
results of illegal wiretapping in the grand jury. The Court, therefore, has
not recognized broad rights in the grand jury witness, but generally has
accorded weight only to specific claims of privilege.
The Court has given even less supervisory attention to the grand jury
15. 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
16. Id. at 282.
17. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
18. Id. at 351-52.
19. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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in its role as a shield against improper indictment. Defendants seeking
relief from alleged improprieties in the indicting grand jury have received
little encouragement from the Supreme Court. The leading case is Cos-
tello v. United States.20 In Costello, the Court refused to invalidate an
indictment even though the grand jury relied on hearsay evidence. The
Court held that the alleged reliance on hearsay did not support a claim of
constitutional violation and, further, the Court declined to exercise its
supervisory authority over the grand jury to check the quality of the evi-
dence. The Costello Court spoke in broad language. Again, the Court
emphasized the freedom of the grand jury to function without impedi-
ments. The Court declared, "An indictment returned by a legally consti-
tuted and unbiased grand jury... if valid on its face, is enough to call for
trial of the charge on the merits."21
B. Recent Cases
Despite this lack of encouragement from the Supreme Court, a
number of lower courts had invoked supervisory authority to inject
greater protection from abuse into the grand jury process. In Mechanik,
Bank of Nova Scotia, and Midland Asphalt, however, the Supreme Court
clearly advocated severely restricted supervisory authority to remedy vio-
lations of grand jury procedure and a limited role for the courts in rela-
tion to the grand jury. In these decisions, the Supreme Court addressed
the process by whibh allegations of grand jury abuse would be reviewed
and established the standard by which claims of abuse should be gauged.
The precise scope of these decisions has yet to be defined. Nevertheless,
two aspects of their effect are clear. First, they foreclose, once and for
all, any significant judicial oversight of the grand jury's shield function.
Second, they remove from the courts' arsenal the most potent remedy for
the abusive use of the grand jury as a sword-dismissal of the
indictment.
L United States v. Mechanik
In United States v. Mechanik,22 the Court held that a violation of Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) would not warrant the dismissal of
an indictment after a jury returned a guilty verdict because the verdict
20. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
21. Id. at 363-64.
22. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
[Vol. 68:885
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rendered any such error at the grand jury stage harmless.2" In
Mechanik, the defendant argued that the presence of an unauthorized
person in the grand jury room when two witnesses testified in tandem
before the indicting grand jury violated the rule. The violation was ar-
guably not a serious one, but the Court did not assess the seriousness of
the alleged violation. Instead, the Court's holding rested on its view of
the roles of Rule 6(d) and Rule 52(a). Rule 6(d), in the Court's view, is
intended to protect a defendant against having to answer charges unsup-
ported by probable cause.24 That harm has been avoided if the prosecu-
tion has produced the proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to
obtain a guilty verdict at trial. Further, the Court saw "no reason" not
to apply Rule 52(a) to errors allegedly occurring before the grand jury.25
Rule 52(a) provides that errors not affecting substantial rights shall be
disregarded and reflects the appropriate balance between the defendant's
interest and society's interest in avoiding the substantial cost of reversal.
Mechanik raises several issues. First, it brings into question the role of
the grand jury. In Mechanik, the Court ascribes to the grand jury and to
the rules governing grand jury procedure a more limited role than some-
times has been suggested. The harmless error test established in
Mechanik focuses only on the grand jury's role in assessing probable
cause. It does not reflect the grand jury's broader role of acting as a
check on the prosecutor's decision to charge at all or to charge at the
level of the proposed indictment, even if supported by probable cause.
At least in the context of Rule 6(d), the Court suggests that the grand
jury's function is to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
probable cause. In fact, the grand jury has often been ascribed the addi-
tional function of acting as a check on the prosecutor's exercise of discre-
tion as well as on the adequacy of the prosecution's evidence.
The additional dimension of the grand jury's role as a shield against
unwarranted indictment, wholly disregarded in Mechanik, has been rec-
ognized by the Court in other cases. In Vasquez v. Hillery,26 for example,
the Court based its decision on this broader view of the grand jury's role
in the indictment process. In Vasquez, the Court stated:
The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to believe
that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the hands of the
23. For a detailed discussion of Mechanik, see Note, supra note 7.
24. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
25. Id. at 71.
26. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
1990]
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grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or a lesser offense;
numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps, most significant of all, a
capital offense or a noncapital offense-all on the basis of the same facts.
Moreover, "[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in every case where a
conviction can be obtained." 27
In Vasquez, the Court held that a defendant could obtain dismissal of
an indictment on grounds of racial discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury even long after a guilty verdict in the case had established
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Mechanik, however, the Court did
not evaluate the impact of the alleged violation of grand jury procedure
on the discretionary aspects of the process; it deemed the error harmless
simply because the prosecution successfully established guilt at trial.
The narrow view of the grand jury's role espoused in Mechanik may
merely reflect the Court's view of Rule 6(d), or it may reflect the Court's
view of the grand jury in its capacity as a shield against improper indict-
ment. The Court stated that Rule 6(d) "protects against the danger that
a defendant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is
no probable cause to believe him guilty."2 If that is indeed the sole pur-
pose of this or any other rule of grand jury procedure, then the intended
protection is provided if the defendant is found guilty at trial, regardless
of the grand jury's role. It is more likely, however, that Mechanik re-
flects the Court's narrow view of the grand jury's role as a shield against
improper indictment and will influence the Court's assessment of any
grand jury abuse that threatens the indictment process.
The Court distinguished Vasquez in language that appears to limit it to
claims of discrimination in the selection of the members of the grand
jury.2 9 In addition, although the Court noted that the lower courts had
observed that 6(d) was designed to ensure that the grand jurors are not
subject to undue influence, the Court did not inquire into any possible
undue influence; the guilty verdict had satisfied the requirement of an
uninfluenced, probable-cause determination.30 The Court did not men-
tion, and the Court's harmless error test leaves no room to consider, the
possibility that the grand jury's role as a shield, described in Vasquez,
could be undermined or neutralized by the presence of an unauthorized
person in the grand jury.
27. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
28. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
29. Id. at 70-71 n.1.
30. See Note, supra note 7, at 1248-49.
[Vol. 68:885
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Second, Mechanik raises the question of when a defendant will ever
receive adequate judicial review of allegations of grand jury abuse. Jus-
tice Marshall, dissenting in Mechanik, pointed out the impact of the deci-
sion on claimed Rule 6(d) violations. He stated:
There is thus little likelihood that a defendant can raise a substantial claim
under Rule 6(d) before his trial begins. After the start of trial, overwork
and the press of events may prevent the district judge from disposing of a
newly raised Rule 6(d) claim. The most attractive course for the district
judge will be to defer a ruling until the close of trial, the course ultimately
followed in this case. Indeed, the district judge may not have the opportu-
nity to rule until that time. Under today's decision, however, deferring a
meritorious Rule 6(d) claim until the close of trial disposes of it perma-
nently. If the movant is acquitted, then his Rule 6(d) motion is moot; if the
movant is convicted, under the majority's reasoning, then any error was
harmless.31
Mechanik makes it unlikely that Rule 6(d) and other similar claims of
grand jury abuse will receive serious judicial attention. Mechanik neces-
sarily raises the specter that other grand jury violations will be subject to
the same harmless error test. The decision therefore forces consideration
of the character of other rules of grand jury procedure to determine
whether, like Rule 6(d), they serve merely to protect against indictments
unsupported by probable cause. Any violation of a rule with such pur-
pose is presumably subject to the Mechanik harmless error test.32
Thus, Mechanik signalled the Court's unwillingness to exert supervi-
sory authority over the grand jury. The harmless error test adopted by
the Court potentially relieved the Court of the burden of reviewing any
claimed 6(d) violation and invited the prosecution to seek similar exemp-
tions for other types of abuse.
2. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,33 decided two years later, the
Court addressed a claim of grand jury abuse raised after indictment but
before trial. The Court held that the district court exceeded its supervi-
sory authority when it dismissed the indictment before trial because of
grand jury violations.34 The Court again viewed Rule 52(a) as a source
31. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. See Note, supra note 7, at 1263-64.
33. 487 U.S. 250 (1988). For a detailed account, see Supreme Court Review, supra note 8, at
1051-56.
34. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263-64.
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of restriction on the courts' authority to remedy grand jury abuses by
dismissing the indictment. Harmless error analysis under Rule 52(a)
must precede any dismissal, at least for nonconstitutional error. The
harm on which that analysis must focus is the impact on the indictment
process. When a motion to dismiss an indictment on grounds of grand
jury abuse is filed before trial, the court should ask whether the abuse
substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict.
In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court considered the numerous allegations
of abuse that had persuaded the district court to dismiss the indictment;
it concluded that none had substantially affected the grand jury's deci-
sion. The defendant had raised violations of Rules 6(c) and 6(e) in addi-
tion to 6(d) violations. The Court discarded some of the claimed abuses
as incapable of having an impact on the grand jury decision.3 5 Without
such an impact, dismissal is an improper remedy. The Court noted other
remedies that would "allow the court to focus on the culpable individual
rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant."136
The Court emphatically restricted the courts' tools for enforcing rules
of grand jury procedure. The Court eliminated use of supervisory power
without a harmless error inquiry, 37 thus foreclosing much of what the
lower courts had done to remedy grand jury abuse. In addition,
although the Court in its final analysis purported to cumulate errors, the
core of the Court's analysis took each alleged violation as a free-standing
matter, subject to harmless error analysis.
There is another significant aspect of Bank of Nova Scotia. The district
court found that the IRS agents just prior to indictment gave misleading
and inaccurate summaries to the grand jury that prejudiced the defend-
ant.38 Despite the threat to the grand jury's shield function, the Court
held that in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, dismissal was not
warranted. In so holding, the Court revitalized Costello in full force.
Costello precludes any challenge to the reliability or competence of the
evidence. This emphatic reafirmance of Costello, restricting the author-
ity of the courts to look behind the indictment to ensure that the grand
jury had appropriate information on which to base its decision to indict,
blocks challenges based on the evidence presented to which some lower
35. Id. at 259-60.
36. Id. at 263.
37. See Supreme Court Review, supra note 8, at 1037.
38. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 260.
[Vol. 68:885
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courts have been receptive. Such a challenge will be entertained only if
the defendant alleges and proves actual prosecutorial misconduct.
Unlike Mechanik, Bank of Nova Scotia did not foreclose review of the
claim of grand jury abuse. Although the Court held that pretrial mo-
tions to dismiss on nonconstitutional grounds must also be subject to
harmless error analysis, the determination of harmlessness is not a fore-
gone conclusion. The test adopted by the Nova Scotia Court focuses on
the impact of the misconduct on the grand jury's decision to indict. The
defendant who seeks dismissal of the indictment before trial on grounds
of violations of grand jury procedure must establish that the violation
substantially affected the grand jury's decision to indict, or that there is
grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influ-
ence of the violation.3 9 This requirement poses a very difficult task for
the defendant. 4
The Court phrased the relevant pretrial harmless error test in terms of
whether the error substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to
indict, but it did not discuss the nature of the influence that would render
an error harmful. The Bank of Nova Scotia Court easily concluded that
none of the alleged errors could have influenced the grand jury in that
case.41 The Court distinguished the categories of grand jury abuse-
those abuses which might influence the indictment process and therefore
warrant dismissal, and those abuses which did not affect the grand jury's
shield function and should therefore be remedied in some other way, if at
all.
Thus, Bank of Nova Scotia provides a defendant recourse before trial,
although it is difficult to obtain, whereas Mechanik eliminates relief after
a guilty trial verdict, at least for some types of violations. Therefore, in
combination, Bank of Nova Scotia and Mechanik give defendants a
strong incentive to pursue pretrial review of all claims of grand jury
abuse.
3. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States
In Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,42 the Court restricted ac-
cess to appellate review of grand jury matters, rejecting defense argu-
ments for pretrial review of grand jury abuse. The Court held that a
39. Id. at 256 (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)).
40. See generally Supreme Court Review, supra note 8, at 1056-62.
41. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 259-60.
42. 109 S. Ct. 1494 (1989).
1990]
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defendant could not appeal the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss
the indictment on grounds of violations of Rule 6(e).43 In the Court's
view, the defendant's rights protected by that rule would be adequately
served by post-trial review, even though post-trial review might be fore-
closed by Mechanik. The Court declined to decide whether Mechanik
applies to Rule 6(e) violations as well as to Rule 6(d) violations, or to
define the purpose of Rule 6(e) protection. The Court instead couched its
opinion in alternative language. If Mechanik does not govern, the Court
noted, then the defendant will be able to obtain appellate review after the
trial. On the other hand, if Mechanik does govern, the Court indicated
that, "it will be because the purpose of [Rule 6(e)] is the same as the
purpose of Rule 6(d), namely, to 'protec[t] against the danger that a de-
fendant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is no
probable cause to believe him guilty.'"" Thus, violations of Rule 6(e),
like violations of 6(d), are not immediately appealable before trial. The
Court, however, has yet to determine whether there can be meaningful
review of those violations after trial.
It is clear that these three decisions restrict both judicial supervision of
the grand jury process and judicial control of grand jury abuse. The ex-
tent of the restriction is not yet clear. The Court in these three cases
confronted only one remedy for alleged abuse-dismissal of an indict-
ment-and only a few types of grand jury abuse which courts have been
asked to remedy or prevent. The significance of these decisions on the
ability of the courts to provide adequate remedies for grand jury abuse
and to supervise the grand jury effectively is the primary subject of this
Article.
III. THE ToOLs OF SUPERVISION
Supervision of the grand jury can be effected at both the district court
and appellate court levels. The district court receives the initial com-
plaints of grand jury abuse and must address the merits of the complaint
and assess the availability of an appropriate remedy. A number of dis-
trict courts, close to the actual misconduct before the grand jury, have
reacted strongly to the government's misbehavior.4" Whether the district
43. Id. at 1498.
44. Id. (citing Mechanik v. United States, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986)).
45. Many district courts have invoked their supervisory powers to dismiss indictments based
upon prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1990) (dis-
missing indictment due to government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence); United States v.
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courts have any means of expressing a strong negative reaction depends
on how drastically the Supreme Court curtails the supervisory authority
and remedial responses of the lower courts.46 The appellate level is the
second level at which supervisory authority is exercised. After the trial
court has responded to the complaint, the losing party will often seek
review of the decision. Appellate oversight of the grand jury process is
also an important factor in determining the effectiveness of the district
courts' supervision of the grand jury.4 7
A. Primary Enforcement Mechanisms
The three decisions discussed above have made it harder for a defend-
ant to obtain review of certain alleged grand jury violations by challeng-
Talbot, 825 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing cases in which courts dismissed indictments under
supervisory powers or on fifth amendment due process grounds), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988);
United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing indictment due to numerous
errors in prosecution's presentation of evidence to the grand jury which strayed beyond permissible
bounds); United States v. Shuck, 705 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. W. Va. 1989) (vacating conviction when
government tainted the grand jury process by enticing defendant's declarations before the grand jury
in violation of his fifth amendment rights), rev'd, 895 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1984) (dismissing indictment under totality of the circum-
stances test, due to cumulative violations of Rule 6(d), Rule 6(e), several witness immunity statutes,
both the fifth and sixth amendments, and presentation of misinformation to the grand jury), rev'd,
821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nor. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250
(1988); United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223 (D. Wyo. 1983) (dismissing indictment because
government violated Rule 6(e) secrecy requirement and presented improper testimony concerning
defendant's legal strategies), rev'd, 778 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. McKenzie, 524 F.
Supp. 186 (E.D. La. 1981) (dismissing indictment when government put undue pressure on grand
jury to indict policeman accused of murder), vacated, 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d
1386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (dismissing indictment when prosecutor, who withheld evidence from the grand jury, dis-
played conflict of interest by acting as both prosecutor and witness, and thereby intruded upon the
grand jury secrecy requirements); United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (dismissing indictment where government negligently drafted complaint charging defendant
with wrong offense and government did not correct the error before the grand jury); United States v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (dismissing indictment due to govern-
ment's withholding of exculpatory testimony); United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp.
579 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (dismissing indictment due to failure of prosecution to present both complete
record of prior grand jury proceedings and statutory provision exempting airlines from antitrust
laws); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (dismissing indictment where
prosecution failed to disclose to grand jury that defendant had colorable claim that charges against
him could have been brought as a product of improper motive and threats), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1224
(9th Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977). See generally Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers,
supra note 3 (discussing lower court views on the use of supervisory power).
46. Section II-A of this Article will discuss some of the enforcement mechanisms available to
the district courts.
47. Access to appellate review is discussed in Section II-B.
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ing the indictment. Nevertheless, those decisions did not address all the
types of violations and all the potential remedies for grand jury abuse.
Supervision of the grand jury remains necessary to curb its potential
abuse.4" It is therefore a good time to take stock and assess the extent of
authority remaining in the federal courts to protect against grand jury
abuse. This section of the Article identifies and discusses enforcement
mechanisms that could be employed to ensure adherence to grand jury
procedure and limit abuses. The focus will be on four types of enforce-
ment mechanisms: dismissing an indictment, sanctioning the prosecutor,
suppressing evidence obtained through grand jury abuse, and remedying
ongoing abuse of the grand jury. While there are other enforcement
mechanisms sometimes sought and sometimes employed, they will only
briefly be mentioned.
To determine the effectiveness of a given remedy as a means of curbing
a given abuse, three questions must be addressed. First, is the remedy
likely to be invoked? This likelihood turns on several factors: whether a
party will learn of the abuse in time to seek the remedy; how difficult it is
to obtain the remedy after the abuse is discovered; and whether the bene-
fit of the remedy is sufficient to warrant the cost of pursuing the remedy.
Second, does the remedy address the abuse in question? If the remedy
is too narrow, it will be an ineffective control. On the other hand, if the
remedy is too broad, it will have more impact but may exceed the court's
authority.
Third, is the remedy calculated to dissuade the prosecutor from fur-
ther similar abusive conduct? Although deterrence may not be the ap-
propriate goal of remedial action, it is certainly a necessary side-effect if
grand jury supervision is to be effective. A remedy that is too slight or
too difficult to obtain will not be an effective supervisory tool.
L Dismissing the Indictment
The most common and most effective mechanism for enforcing grand
jury procedure is to dismiss any indictment obtained through a grand
jury process tainted by abuse. If the alleged grand jury abuse com-
promises the grand jury's ability to act as a shield, dismissal is the appro-
48. See generally Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers, supra note 3 (advocating use of
supervisory powers to dismiss indictments even when misconduct does not prejudice grand jury's
decision to indict and provides framework for establishing a workable standard of application that
identifies when dismissal is warranted); Fine, supra note 3.
[Vol. 68:885
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss4/5
WHO WATCHES THE GUARDIAN?
priate remedy.49 In addition, if the prosecution has abused the grand
jury by employing its power as a prosecutorial sword, dismissing any
indictment resulting from the abusive investigation is a desirable remedy
and offers a means of addressing the abuse without relying on collateral
proceedings that disrupt the criminal process.
The incentive to pursue dismissal is tremendous. The benefit to the
defendant is obvious; the defendant's greatest desire is to avoid prosecu-
tion. Moreover, the defendant may not learn of the abuse in time to
benefit from the earlier, more limited and more focused remedies. Often
the defendant first learns of grand jury abuses only after indictment,
through pretrial discovery or through the disclosure that accompanies
the trial. Thus, dismissal is a remedy likely to be invoked. Dismissal
also offers the greatest opportunity to deter prosecutorial misconduct
because the price paid by the prosecution is so great. If granted with any
regularity, dismissal could prompt the government to avoid
misconduct.50
However, dismissal has never been an easily obtained remedy and is
now unlikely to be a realistic enforcement mechanism for addressing
grand jury abuse.51 The message of the recent Supreme Court decisions
is that dismissal will be an even more difficult remedy to obtain in the
future.
The problem with dismissal is its apparent overbreadth. In Mechanik,
the Court defined the role of the grand jury as passing on probable cause.
The role of the grand jury has sometimes been viewed as broader, entail-
ing a responsibility to check the prosecutor's exercise of discretion as well
as the probable cause function. Regardless of which view of the grand
49. In United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985), Judge Posner, writing for the
majority, stated that "[g]iven the absolute immunity of prosecutors from civil damage suits, it is hard
to imagine what the legal sanction for this misconduct would be unless it were dismissal of the
indictment - after trial and conviction if need be, that is, if the fraud was not discovered earlier."
However, the court also provided three arguments against the imposition of dismissal as the appro-
priate sanction. First, if the prosecutor's case is, in actuality, completely phony, the defendant will
not be convicted, and the prosecutor will have wasted valuable time in seeking the indictment. Sec-
ond, an indictment based upon perjury or inaccurate evidence is harmless if the defendant is con-
victed on other sufficient evidence. Third, providing the defendant with the option to challenge his
conviction based upon inadequate evidence presented to the grand jury would further complicate
already complex criminal proceedings. Id. at 1202-03.
50. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 818 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he prospect of cases lost
because of attorney misconduct is likely to produce a sharp improvement in the procedures adopted
by the United States Attorneys to control attorney conduct before the grand jury.").
51. See generally, Note, supra note 7.
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jury's role is espoused, however, dismissing an indictment is often an
overly drastic remedy for grand jury abuse. For many abuses, dismissing
the indictment goes beyond addressing the wrong and, in the words of
the Court, acts as a windfall to the defendant.52 If used to remedy a
violation that undermined the grand jury's shield function, but did not
prejudice the decision to indict, dismissal acts as a prophylactic measure
designed to deter further abuses.53 Similarly, dismissal acts as a prophy-
lactic if it is used to remedy an abuse of the grand jury's sword function.
Commentators have questioned the courts' authority to order remedies
to achieve a deterrent effect, 54 and the current Supreme Court is hostile
to prophylactic remedies and the exercise of supervisory authority to
achieve a deterrent effect.5"
The Court's decisions concerning the grand jury reflect that hostility.
52. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988).
53. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 726-27 (10th Cir.) ("Dismissal of an indictment
after a conviction is essentially a prophylactic measure, designed more to deter prosecutorial miscon-
duct before the grand jury than to protect a particular defendant's rights."), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
918 (1987).
54. There is controversy among legal commentators concerning the scope of the courts' super-
visory power. See generally Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases" Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1434-35
(1984) (current use of federal supervisory power is over-broad, and "the concept of supervisory
power should be abandoned in favor of identifying more specifically the constitutional or statutory
power being employed."); Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question ofArticle III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1985) (discussing the use of supervisory power as a prophylactic
remedy); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 53 (1985)
(judicially created remedies are appropriate only when "necessary in order to preserve a specifically
intended federal right.").
55. Outside the grand jury context, the Court has expressed hostility and skepticism to prophy-
lactic remedies. See, eg., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (suppression of evidence obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is not constitutionally compelled); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of fourth amend-
ment is not constitutionally compelled); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984) (even though
discriminatory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Constitution, reversing petitioner's con-
viction was inappropriate remedy since grand jury foremen play a minor role in prosecution); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (reversals of convictions under court's supervisory power
must be approached with some caution even in light of prosecutorial misconduct, and harmless error
doctrine may not be avoided by an assertion of supervisory power to justify such a reversal); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (illegal search of a third party's briefcase uncovered federal
income tax violations for which the defendant was convicted; held supervisory power does not au-
thorize a federal court to exclude evidence that did not violate defendant's fourth amendment rights
due to lack of standing); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.) (district court exceeded
authority in dismissing indictment where grand jury heard transcripts of prior grand jury testimony
containing inconsistencies, prosecution advised grand jury that inconsistencies in witness' testimony
existed, and the testimony in the transcript included confessions of submitting false affidavits), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
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In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court implemented a restrictive view of the
courts' supervisory authority. The Court turned to Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;56 Rule 52(a) expresses Congress'
intent that every violation not become grounds for relief.5 7 The Court
held that, because the basis of the courts' authority to supervise the
grand jury is not clearly defined, that authority is subordinate to the con-
gressional authority expressed in Rule 52(a).18 As a consequence, the
Court curtailed the availability of dismissal as a tool of supervision. The
Court restricted dismissal to cases in which the defendant can establish
that some procedural violation impaired the grand jury's shield function,
and that the impairment was not harmless error. The defendant must
identify and prove corruption of the indictment decision and that such
corruption arose from the procedural violation.5 9
The Court's approach eliminates dismissal as a remedy for many viola-
tions of procedural rules intended to protect against abusive use of the
grand jury's investigative sword. Rules regulating the grand jury's use as
a sword generally do not address the indictment decision. Such rules are
intended to prevent use of the grand jury for purposes other than to se-
cure an indictment or to ensure that the witnesses who appear before the
grand jury are not treated abusively. In some cases, of course, the party
aggrieved by such a violation is not indicted and therefore would have to
seek an alternative remedy to dismissal. Even an indicted defendant who
can point to prosecutorial abuse in the indicting grand jury, however,
may discover that the violation does not warrant dismissal under the
Bank of Nova Scotia test. Violation of a rule addressed primarily to the
sword aspect of the grand jury is unlikely to undermine the indictment
decision and therefore warrant dismissal under the Bank of Nova Scotia
test. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court summarily rejected three of the
defendants' allegations of abuse-gathering evidence for civil audit,
breaching the secrecy of the grand jury, and imposing improper secrecy
obligations on grand jury witnesses-because "these alleged breaches
could not have affected the charging decision. '
Some types of abuse, such as abusive questioning, generally represent a
misuse of the grand jury in its capacity as a sword but may in an extreme
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
57. See Supreme Court Review, supra note 8, at 1059.
58. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-55.
59. See generally Supreme Court Review, supra note 8; Note, supra note 7.
60. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 259-60.
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case undermine its function as a shield. Some courts have responded
angrily to transcripts recording abusive questioning before the grand
jury,61 and might be persuaded that the grand jury did not retain its in-
dependent judgment, but was unduly influenced or prejudiced by the im-
proper questioning. However, even clearly abusive questioning may
appear inconsequential when reviewed on a cold record in the context of
a lengthy grand jury investigation.
The defendant complaining before trial of a violation of a rule ad-
dressed to the grand jury's shield function may seek relief under Bank of
Nova Scotia, but will face a difficult task. The defendant must demon-
strate that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision
to indict or that there is grave doubt that the decision was free from such
influence. Unfortunately, the Court has not addressed how this showing
might be made. In fact, Bank of Nova Scotia creates an apparent incon-
sistency. The Court held that presentation of unreliable evidence was not
a basis on which to challenge the indictment. That holding reflects the
Court's reluctance to require lower courts to examine the evidence
presented to the grand jury.
The Bank of Nova Scotia Court did not address the extent to which its
harmless error test requires the court to scrutinize the grand jury's basis
for the indictment. Nor did the Court suggest how to evaluate the im-
pact of procedural violations on a grand jury process tainted by inaccu-
rate evidence. Thus, courts must reconcile the standard of prejudice,
which requires the court to examine the influences, including the evi-
dence presented, that led the grand jury to indict, as well as the refusal to
entertain a challenge to an indictment based on the evidence presented.
Once error is established, the only way to determine prejudice as defined
by the Court is to examine the evidence presented to the grand jury and
determine whether the jury would have indicted even in the absence of
improper conduct by the prosecutor. If the grand jury was exposed to
abusive conduct by the prosecutor and indicted without substantial per-
suasive evidence, the likelihood of a causal connection seems significant;
the prejudice standard should be held to have been satisfied.
Although this course of analysis does not lead to dismissal of the in-
dictment purely on the basis of the quality and quantity of evidence
presented to the indicting grand jury, it does make quality and quantity
61. See, eg., United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Shuck, 705 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. W. Va. 1989).
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of evidence a significant factor in determining whether a defendant is
entitled to relief on the basis of violation of grand jury procedures. In
Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court noted that the instances of misconduct
"occurred as isolated episodes in the course of a 20-month investigation,
an investigation involving dozens of witnesses and thousands of docu-
ments."62 The Court continued: "In view of this context, those viola-
tions that did occur do not, even when considered cumulatively, raise a
substantial question, much less a grave doubt, as to whether they had a
substantial effect on the grand jury's decision."63 Thus, the Court
glanced at the quantity of evidence presented on its way to concluding
there was no prejudice. In other cases, however, the court assessing prej-
udice is likely to find itself scrutinizing the evidence presented in the
grand jury investigation.
The criteria for obtaining dismissal on grounds of grand jury abuse are
now extremely difficult to satisfy." The purpose of the rule that is vio-
lated will govern whether dismissal will be considered as a remedy; how-
ever, the purpose can be difficult to ascertain. Even if dismissal is
theoretically available to remedy a particular abuse, it is very difficult to
demonstrate prejudice. Consequently, the other potential means of ad-
dressing grand jury abuse have acquired greater significance.
2. Sanctioning the Prosecutor
One approach to enforcement of grand jury rules is to impose a sanc-
tion directly upon the individual prosecutor. In Bank of Nova Scotia the
Court suggested that sanctions imposed on the prosecutor would be more
62. 487 U.S. at 263.
63. Id.
64. See, eg., United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissal of grand jury
indictment is appropriate only upon a showing of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct that sufficiently
infringes upon the independent judgment of the grand jury and prejudices the defendant); See also
United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1985) (to obtain dismissal, defendant must prove not
only that the prosecutor had knowledge of the inaccurate evidence, but also that the indictment
would not have issued without reliance upon that inaccurate evidence). But see United States v.
Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1990) (government's withholding of substantial exculpatory infor-
mation from the grand jury prejudiced the defendant and warranted dismissal of the indictment).
See generally Comment, supra note 8. "Because the deliberations and vote of the grand jurors are
insulated from any type of disclosure, it never will be possible to determine what actually has influ-
enced the grand jury's decision." Id. at 285. Both applying and satisfying the test is difficult. "[A]s
a result of the Court's holding that a guilty verdict renders prosecutorial errors harmless, Mechanik
gives prosecutors essentially free reign to act with impunity. Depending on when errors are discov-
ered, the grand jury can be manipulated, controlled and even abused by the prosecutor." Id. at 288-
89.
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appropriate for some of the abuses of which the defendant complained
than dismissal of the indictment. Specifically, the Court stated:
Errors of the kind alleged in these cases can be remedied adequately by
means other than dismissal. For example, a knowing violation of Rule 6
may be punished as a contempt of court .... In addition, the court may
direct a prosecutor to show cause why he should not be disciplined and
request the bar or the Department of Justice to initiate disciplinary pro-
ceedings against him. The court may also chastise the prosecutor in a pub-
lished opinion. 65
Unfortunately, imposing sanctions on the prosecutor is a remedy of
limited effectiveness. In United States v. Serubo,6 6 the court lamented the
lack of response to judicial efforts to curtail prosecutorial misconduct
and expressed skepticism about the hope of using this mechanism to cur-
tail abuse in the grand jury. The court stated:
Certainly the constant flow of cases to this court involving prosecutorial
misconduct before petit juries demonstrates that judicial "tongue clicking"
and adjurations as to the "better practice" are likely to have little impact on
the problem. And while professional disciplinary sanctions may be avail-
able, criminal defendants are unlikely to be in a position to initiate such
proceedings, or to see that they are pressed to a successful conclusion.67
Although courts refer to sanctions as a mechanism for enforcing grand
jury procedural rules, the decisions do not reflect actual use of such sanc-
tions.68 In addition, there is little reason to believe that the government
has employed sanctions to discourage improper behavior by prosecu-
tors.69 The Court's refusal to permit use of dismissal to remedy many
65. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted). See also United States v. Dozier,
672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.) (rejecting defendants' requests for dismissal and stating that contempt is the
appropriate remedy), cert denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods.,
Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir.) (same), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973).
66. 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
67. Id at 817-18 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301,
310 (1st Cir. 1989) (the court expressed concern that the prosecutor had not heeded the prior judicial
pronouncements condemning the offending practice and stated that stronger measures might be
taken).
68. See Note, supra note 7, at 1270 n.166.
69. The Annual Reports to the Attorney General from the Office of Professional Responsibility
for the years 1983-86 reveal almost no disciplinary action based on misuse of the grand jury. The
Office of Professional Responsibility does report one contempt proceeding against a United States
Attorney who violated Rule 6(e) by leaking information to a friend who was charged in a sealed
indictment. The motivation to use its authority to seek contempt sanctions when a breach of grand
jury secrecy threatens law enforcement interests is obviously stronger than the motivation to use it
when the violation threatens only the interests of the subjects or witnesses.
In addition to judicial decisions and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Department of Justice
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abuses, however, makes this route extremely important.
Unfortunately, several factors limit the effectiveness of sanctions. First,
the victim may have minimal incentive to invoke the sanction. The crim-
inal investigation will continue despite the sanction, and the harm to the
victim and the victim's reputation and relationships will not be addressed
by sanctioning the prosecutor. In addition, the remedy may be difficult
to invoke. The victim of a grand jury violation may not be in a position
to initiate proceedings to impose sanctions on the prosecution.
The available information suggests that contempt and disciplinary ac-
tions are used rarely, if at all, to punish violations of grand jury proce-
dure. The subject of a grand jury investigation has rarely sought
contempt sanctions against those conducting the investigation. Rule 6(e)
was amended in 1977 to provide: "A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be
punished as a contempt of court."7 Nevertheless, the judges considering
the question do not uniformly agree that the subject of the grand jury
investigation can pursue civil contempt; some judges regard the rule as
permitting the imposition of criminal contempt. 1 If the contempt is
criminal rather than civil, the aggrieved private party cannot initiate the
contempt action but can only appeal to the prosecutor or the court to
initiate the proceeding.72 Certainly, a private party cannot initiate disci-
plinary proceedings within the government. Moreover, the government
has demonstrated little inclination to invoke its authority to sanction
grand jury abuse. Despite repeated allegations of abuse, no cases involv-
ing contempt proceedings initiated by the government have been
reported.
Second, even when sanctions against the prosecutor are pursued, they
may not represent an effective remedy, because such sanctions only reach
a narrow sub-group of abuses. For example, to obtain sanctions for a
violation of Rule 6(e), the victim must first establish that the secrecy of
Manual also governs prosecutorial behavior. Deviations from the regulations in the Manual could
support disciplinary action, but do not appear to have been used in that way. In Pacheco-Ortiz, 889
F.2d 301, 311 (1st Cir. 1989), the court predicted that future deviations from the procedure pre-
scribed by the Department of Justice might be referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility
and that the response of that office would then be monitored. See also United States v. Helmsley,
866 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1988) (alluding to an investigation of secrecy violations being undertaken by
the Department of Justice).
70. FED. R. CraM. P. 6(eX2).
71. See, eg., Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980) (Kravitch, J., dissenting). Resolving this debate is beyond the
scope of this article.
72. See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 701-711 (1982).
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the grand jury has been breached. Often, the complaint is prompted by
newspaper or magazine articles reflecting knowledge of information
before the grand jury. The articles themselves, reflecting information
gathered in the grand jury, may suffice to establish a prima facie case,
requiring the government to respond and establish that it is not responsi-
ble for the apparent leak.73 However, not all courts have held that news
reports reflecting information before the grand jury provide sufficient evi-
dence of a leak to force the government to respond.74 Thus, in many
instances a breach of secrecy will not result in sanctions because the vic-
tim cannot establish a government-created leak.
Victims seeking punitive sanctions face similar evidentiary problems.
Punitive sanctions will be imposed only when the prosecutor responsible
for the abuse can be identified75 and the abuse is shown to be inten-
tional. 76 Not only is identification of the abuser difficult, but there is no
reason to believe that most violations are intentional. Violations are
more likely to be the result of poorly trained or overzealous prosecutors
than bad faith.77 Consequently, even when there has been serious grand
73. See, eg., Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. See, eg., In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978).
75. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980) (illustrating
difficulty of determining identity of those who released confidential grand jury information).
76. See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (willful disobe-
dience of a valid injunction constitutes contempt of court); United States v. Smith, 815 F.2d 24, 25-
26 (6th Cir. 1987) (ordinarily, willfulness is required mental state for contempt unless the charge is
brought under a statute or rule which specifies a different mental state such as knowledge); Vaughn
v. City of Flint, 752 F.2d 1160, 1169 (6th Cir. 1985) (requiring willful disobedience to be proven
beyond a doubt and defining willfulness as "'deliberate or intended violation, as distinguished from
an accidental, inadvertent or negligent violation' ") (quoting TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp. 722 F.2d
1261, 1272 (6th Cir. 1983)); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 (5th Cir. 1978) (knowing
violation of Rule 6(e)(2) secrecy requirement held to constitute criminal contempt), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 834 (1978); In re Allis, 531 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1976) (contempt requires a willful disregard or
disobedience of public authority), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 900 (1976). See generally 3 C. WRIoHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 702 (1982).
77. The Department of Justice Manual includes a number of provisions giving general and, in
some instances, specific guidance concerning grand jury procedure. The majority of provisions pro-
vide only general guidance. See, eg., 7 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-11.120 (1990) (gener-
ally defines role of prosecutor); Id. at § 9-11.140 (general guideline on limits of grand jury
subpoenas); Id. at § 9-11.153 (general guideline on notification of targets); Id. at § 9-11.154 (general
guideline on when witness may be compelled despite claims of fifth amendment privilege); Id. at § 9-
11.232 (general guideline on use of hearsay evidence); Id. at § 9-11.233 (general guideline on presen-
tation of exculpatory evidence). Some, however, provide more specific guidance. See, eg., id. at § 9-
11.150 (guidance on advising witness of rights). That the reported abuses generally reflect deviations
from the Justice Department guidelines suggests inadequate training and internal supervision.
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jury misconduct, sanctions against the prosecutor may be inappropriate,
and even when sanctions would be appropriate, the evidentiary hurdles
may be insurmountable.
Third, the sanctions will have limited deterrent effect. They act only
on the individual offender and are unlikely to exert institutional pressure
sufficient to prevent future misconduct by other prosecutors. The expec-
tation that sanctions imposed on peers will deter other prosecutors from
misconduct is overly optimistic. It is safe to assume that much abuse
goes undisclosed, and even when it is disclosed, sanctions are rarely im-
posed. It appears that the institutional pressure flowing from the greater
scrutiny applied to the grand jury process in the last two decades has
done little to improve training programs that might prevent improper
behavior. It is unrealistic to expect a remedy with such limited institu-
tional impact to accomplish what more drastic remedies have not.
Timing may also diminish the effectiveness of sanctions against the
prosecutor. Misconduct frequently first comes to light during the pro-
cess of post-indictment discovery or at trial.7" At that juncture, unless
the misconduct also gives the defendant a viable argument for dismissal
of the indictment, the defendant has diminished incentive to call the
court's attention to the misconduct. The remaining incentive is the de-
fendant's ability to adopt a position that may be used to his advantage in
bargaining with the prosecution. If the defendant is not prompted by
such a motive, the situation may be overlooked entirely unless a vigilant
trial judge obtains access to grand jury transcripts reflecting the abusive
behavior. Furthermore, due to the length of many investigations and the
delay between indictment and trial, the prosecutor may have left the
78. See, eg., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 68 (1986) (before trial, the government
represented that there had been no unauthorized presence in the grand jury room); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (defendant first developed a record of the grand jury process at
trial). Most of the grand jury transcripts the defense receives will be provided only as required by 18
U.S.C. § 3500 at the beginning of trial or as trial proceeds. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
may require the prosecution to provide some grand jury information before trial. For example, if the
defendant has testified or provided handwriting or fingerprints, Rule 16 would require pretrial dis-
closure. In addition, some grand jury information must be turned over to the defense because it is
exculpatory, and the prosecution is therefore obligated to provide it to the defendant in a timely
manner. See, eg., United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). Of course, some grand jury
information will never be given to the defense because it is not regarded as exculpatory by the prose-
cution, does not fall within Rule 16 discovery, or is not covered by section 3500 because the grand
jury witness never testified at trial. The defendant can obtain access to such information only by
satisfying the requirement of particularized need established by Rule 6(e). See also 2 S. BEALE & W.
BRYSON, supra note 3, at § 7:11 (discussing difficulty of making showing necessary to gain access to
grand jury material).
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prosecutor's office by the time the misconduct comes to light, reducing
even further the sanction's institutional impact.
3. Suppressing Evidence
Another remedial approach is to prevent the government from using
the improperly obtained or tainted evidence. In both civil and criminal
prosecutions, courts have the authority to suppress evidence obtained
through abuse of the grand jury process. 79 The remedy has theoretical
appeal, but realistically, its possibilities are limited.
In theory, the remedy of suppression corresponds exactly to the
wrong. There is a strong incentive to pursue the remedy; the party mov-
ing to suppress stands to gain a specific litigation advantage if successful.
Further, the prosecutor will be discouraged from misusing the grand jury
to gain an advantage if there is a realistic possibility that the advantage
will be removed through a suppression order. For example, if a prosecu-
tor improperly employs the grand jury to investigate an indicted criminal
case, the gravamen of the offense is that the powers of the grand jury are
being employed to obtain evidence for use in another setting, one in
which the extraordinary powers of the grand jury are not available. Sup-
pressing the improperly obtained evidence should adequately address the
abuse of the grand jury. Similarly, if the prosecution improperly ques-
tions a witness before the grand jury, suppressing the grand jury testi-
mony directly addresses at least one aspect of that abuse.
Several factors, however, limit the effectiveness of this enforcement
mechanism. First, the remedy is inappropriate for many types of abuse.
Suppression is a suitable remedy for abuses such as improper use of the
grand jury to develop a civil case or to investigate an indicted criminal
case or improper questioning before the grand jury. Some abuses, such
as secrecy violations and failures to present exculpatory evidence, may
cause harm and may undermine the shield function of the grand jury, but
do not yield evidence. Therefore, suppression does not address the abuse
directly.
Second, in the instances in which it is appropriate, suppression is diffi-
cult to obtain. The standards are set so high that the defendant will
rarely be able to make the requisite showing.A0 Indeed, the standards are
79. See United States v. Coughlan, 842 F.2d 737, 740 (4th Cir. 1988) (remanding for further
consideration and acknowledging that suppression could be the appropriate remedy).
80. For example, to determine whether a grand jury is improperly employed to investigate an
already indicted criminal case, the court must assess the dominant purpose of the grand jury's inves-
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so stringent that the prosecution has little reason to be concerned. The
aggrieved party will only rarely be able to meet its burden and the rem-
edy will rarely be imposed. In addition, the court may forego the sanc-
tion out of fear that imposing the sanction will free a guilty defendant.8
Third, invoking the remedy may have no significant negative impact
on the prosecution's case. Adhering to the narrow remedial approach of
Bank of Nova Scotia, the court may suppress only the evidence obtained
through the abuse. Thus, despite the imposition of such a remedy, the
prosecution may still have sufficient other evidence to prosecute success-
fully. This possibility further diminishes the prophylactic impact of sup-
pression as a remedy for grand jury abuse.
tigation. Unless it is clear that the prosecution can claim no further relevant investigation, the court
is unlikely to identify an impermissible purpose. Frequently, the complaining defendant is hampered
by a lack of evidence and the reluctance of the court to expose the investigation to scrutiny by the
defense. The defense claim may be answered to the court's satisfaction by government affidavits or
the defendant may receive only in camera review of related materials, foreclosing informed defense
argument concerning the actual course and purpose of the ongoing investigation. See generally In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Ferrandez Diamente), 814 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Zarat-
tini, 552 F.2d 753 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 942 (1977); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); United States v. Doe (Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270
(Ist Cir. 1972); In re Grand Jury Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 32 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 902 (1963). But see United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Kovaleski, 406 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON,
supra note 3, at § 10:15. Of course, return of an indictment by the challenged grand jury will defeat
the defendant's claim of improper use. See United States v. Scott, 784 F.2d 787 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1986).
A claim that the prosecution improperly used the grand jury to develop a civil case is likewise
difficult to establish. In some cases, the prosecutor overseeing the grand jury inquiry will have a
conflict of interest because of involvement as a party in a related civil matter. In such a case, the risk
of information flowing from the criminal investigation to the party in the civil suit may warrant an
order disqualifying the prosecutor from participation in the grand jury process. Cf In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 873 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1989). Normally, however, the courts accept that a proper crimi-
nal investigation may also uncover civil violations. The failure of the grand jury to return an indict-
ment does not establish that it was misused for solely civil investigation. See United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). Attorneys investigating the case in the grand jury are free to
work on the civil investigation as well. See United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102 (1987).
Government affidavits may respond adequately to the claim of misuse; the complaining party may
not receive access to the grand jury materials. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Miller Brew. Co.),
687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1982). Relief is likely to be available only in a case such as United States v.
Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Doe, the prosecution listed discovery of civil violations
and liabilities in a request that IRS agents be given access to evidence to be gathered in an ongoing
investigation. That expression of intended civil use persuaded the court to deny the government's
request. See generally 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 3, at §§ 8:01-8:11.
81. See United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 309 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S.
31 (1978).
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4. Remedying Ongoing Abuses
If an aggrieved party can identify an ongoing abuse of the grand jury
and make a showing sufficient to satisfy the court that the abuse is real,
the party may be able to obtain immediate relief from the abuse.82 For
example, the court may enjoin the abusive conduct or may excuse the
witness from compliance with the grand jury request. Effective and
prompt action to address ongoing grand jury abuse is essential to super-
vise the grand jury's role as the prosecutor's sword and may also enhance
its effectiveness as a shield. Courts may tailor an equitable remedy ad-
dressed to an ongoing problem to fit the situation. The abuse can be
addressed without generating a windfall for the complaining party. Such
remedies also offer a means for bringing to light abuses in grand jury
investigations that never culminate in indictment.
Two major barriers, however, diminish the effectiveness of these reme-
dies as mechanisms for supervising the grand jury. First, detection of
abuse in time to seek immediate judicial action is difficult. In many
cases, abuse is first detected at trial. Even when abuse is suspected earlier
in the process, it is usually difficult to document. The decided cases illus-
trate both the difficulty of establishing the prima facie case that entitles
the party to an evidentiary hearing 3 and the ease with which govern-
ment affidavits asserting lack of abuse can refute such allegations. 84
Second, access to the remedies that address ongoing abuses is limited.
The party asking the court to remedy an ongoing abuse of the grand jury
is generally asking the court to intrude to some degree into the investiga-
tion. As a number of cases demonstrate, the courts are extremely reluc-
tant to intrude into the operation of the grand jury to the extent required
to identify and remedy alleged abuses while the investigation is
ongoing.85
82. See eg., Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Beverly v. United States,
468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Grand Jury 89-2, 728 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1990). Cf In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 873 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1989).
83. In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978); Beverly, 468 F.2d 732.
See also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321 (petitioner entitled to evidentiary hearing); United States v. Eisen-
berg, 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983) (target's remedies to be restricted despite prima facie showing of
grand jury abuse).
84. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980); Universal Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 508 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Beverly, 468 F.2d 732.
85. See, eg., United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959 (1 Ith Cir. 1983); In re Archuletta, 432 F.
Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); See also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1323 (expressing concern that remedies
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Despite these problems, it is worth examining equitable remedies ad-
dressed to ongoing abuses. When available, they offer an unusually satis-
factory mechanism for supervising the grand jury. In addition, because
the Supreme Court has limited the authority of the lower courts to ad-
dress grand jury abuse through other remedies, equitable responses to
ongoing problems have acquired greater significance and should be con-
sidered seriously whenever a party can identify an abuse. If a party re-
quests an equitable remedy, a court can no longer respond that the party
has an adequate remedy at law, namely the option of moving to dismiss
the indictment if one is returned.86 Equitable intervention in the grand
jury process may offer the only opportunity to address abusive grand jury
practices.
a. Permitting the Witness to Resist the Compulsion
of the Grand Jury
One remedy addressed to an immediate threat of abuse is to permit the
witness to resist the compulsion of the grand jury. A grand jury witness
has traditionally had one clear route to judicial review of grand jury ac-
tion that threatens the witness' rights-to refuse to comply with the or-
der of the grand jury and to raise the legal claim as a defense when the
prosecutor seeks to invoke the court's contempt authority to compel
compliance. Not only will the witness be able to bring a legal claim
before the court in this manner, but the witness who does not prevail will
also be able to appeal the rejection of the legal claim if the witness per-
sists in refusing to comply and is held in contempt. The rights most
often asserted successfully in the grand jury-the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and evidentiary privileges-are normally
raised in this manner. The claim of privilege is easily raised, readily ad-
dressed by the court, subject to appellate review, and completely prohib-
its further grand jury inquiry into the privileged matter. Consequently,
this enforcement mechanism has been a powerful tool for restraining the
grand jury from probing into confidential or otherwise privileged
matters.
However, not all improper questioning falls within the prohibition of a
constitutional or an evidentiary privilege. Prosecutors sometimes in-
dulge in questioning that improperly harasses or degrades the witness or
86. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a request
for injunctive relief against grand jury abuse in part on the basis that an adequate remedy was
available at law).
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is designed to inflame or prejudice the grand jurors. Resisting the com-
pulsion of the grand jury may not address abusive questioning of this
type. The harm to the witness lies in the embarrassment or humiliation
inflicted by the questions. Therefore, the witness may not bother to com-
plain about the abuse; the witness may not want to devote the time and
money necessary to go before the court to get review of a legal claim
through the vehicle of noncompliance. Furthermore, if the witness de-
clines to answer in the grand jury, the prosecutor may not bring the mat-
ter before the court to compel compliance.
Abusive questioning of this type is not designed to advance the investi-
gation by eliciting information; it may simply represent an outburst of
the prosecutor's temper or may be designed to prejudice the grand jury
and to harass the witness. The prosecutor can accomplish all of these
objectives even if the witness merely endures the questioning without an-
swering the questions. Some damage will result, yet the matter may
never be brought before the court.
The courts offer little incentive for the witness with the unconventional
claim to seek protection from grand jury abuse. When witnesses have
appealed to the courts for permission not to cooperate with the grand
jury on grounds other than privilege, the courts have given the mecha-
nism little effect as a means of supervising the grand jury. Even if the
witness identifies an abuse, the remedy is usually unattainable. In Blair
v. United States,87 the Court foreclosed grand jury witnesses from raising
most challenges other than claims of privilege. Blair established that a
mere witness has no standing to question the grand jury's investigation;
the grand jury must be free from such interference. The Court empha-
sized the public duty to provide information when called by the grand
jury. The Court noted:
The duty, so onerous at times, yet so necessary to the administration of
justice according to the forms and modes established in our system of gov-
ernment is subject to mitigation in exceptional circumstances; there is a
constitutional exemption from being compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against oneself, entitling the witness to be excused from answering
anything that will tend to incriminate him; some confidential matters are
shielded from considerations of policy, and perhaps in other cases for spe-
cial reasons a witness may be excused from telling all that he knows.88
The Supreme Court has not been receptive to witnesses' efforts to resist
87. 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
88. Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 68:885
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss4/5
1990] WHO WATCHES THE GUARDIAN?
the compulsion of the grand jury on the basis of a claim of threatened
abuse rather than a specific claim of privilege. In United States v. Calan-
dra, 9 the Court rejected the argument that the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule should operate to protect a grand jury witness from being
compelled to answer questions based on illegally seized evidence. In
Branzburg v. Hayes,9° the Court held that the potential threat to a news
reporter's access to confidential sources is inadequate to overcome the
reporter's obligation to respond to the grand jury's subpoena and provide
the requested information.
In most cases, witnesses have been forced to cooperate with the grand
jury despite allegations of unauthorized disclosure under Rule 6(e) or
other violations. 91 In some cases, however, the aggrieved party has pre-
vailed. In In re Kiefaber,92 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
order quashing subpoenas that it concluded had been issued to assist the
prosecution to violate Rule 6(e). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated January 2, 1985, 93 the court ordered that a grand jury sub-
poena addressed to an indicted defendant's lawyer be quashed. The cir-
89. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
90. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See generally Deutsch, supra note 3 (political right of silence exists
based upon freedom of association which should prevent government from compelling cooperation
with grand jury in investigations involving political beliefs and associations); Weisman and Postal,
The Grand Jury: The First Amendment as a Restraint on the Grand Jury Process, 10 Am. CRIM. L.
REv. 671 (1972) (discussing the relationship between the first amendment and the grand jury).
91. See, eg., In re Sinadinos, 760 F.2d 167, 172-73 (7th Cir. 1985) (immunized witness could
not refuse to testify on ground that memory of events was unclear and therefore he might be exposed
to prosecution for pejury); In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1985) (assertions of grand
jury leaks were mere speculation and did not warrant contemnor's release even though contemnor
feared for his life if he testified); United States v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d 347, 350-51 (4th Cir. 1983)
(motion to quash subpoena denied even though possibility existed that prosecutor might use sub-
poena to coerce plea bargain against relative of the witness by threatening harm to witness if he did
not testify against his relative); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Burns), 652 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1981)
(fear for safety of family and self is not a basis for refusing to provide grand jury testimony under
grant of immunity); United States v. Zappola, 646 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1981) (government informant
could not invoke self-incrimination privilege as grounds to refuse to testify since he did not have
legitimate fear of prosecution due to limited scope of questions concerning his undercover duties);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant could not invoke
defense of duress to avoid testifying where government had offered him protection from the threats
and he declined to accept); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 1979)
(court reluctant to conclude that confinement for contempt has lost its coercive effect after time
period short of the 18-month statutory limit); In re Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 583 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (alleged leaking of grand jury information by law enforcement authorities did not warrant
quashing of subpoena). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See generally Comment supra note 3.
92. 774 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1985).
93. 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
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cumstances in which the subpoena was issued convinced the court that
the prosecution improperly employed the grand jury to prepare an al-
ready indicted case for trial.9 4
Generally, however, this common and effective means of curbing the
grand jury's inclination to probe into unpermitted areas is not available
as a tool for checking grand jury abuse.
b. Equitable Relief
Courts may employ their flexible equitable authority to address ongo-
ing grand jury abuse. When a problem is raised and substantiated, the
court may be able to craft a remedy tailored to the problem. Some par-
ties have raised aggressive and creative arguments for remedies of ongo-
ing abuses. Some requests, such as the plea to terminate the
investigation, are so intrusive that no court would grant them.95 Courts
may grant many other equitable remedies, however, without unduly dis-
rupting the grand jury. The court may give the grand jury instructions
to counteract the abuse or may direct the prosecutors to instruct the
grand jury.96 The court may, short of imposing the sanction of con-
tempt, enjoin improper conduct or at least remind those working with
the grand jury of their obligations.97 The court may also order the prose-
94. It is worth noting that on February 12, 1990, the A.B.A. House of Delegates adopted an
amendment to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility which would eliminate the
problem in Simels. It provides that the prosecution should not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury
proceeding unless:
(1) the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(i) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by an applicable privilege;
(ii) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investi-
gation or prosecution;
('ii) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and
(2) the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an opportunity for an adversarial
proceeding.
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8(f), reprinted in S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, JR.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS 148-49 (1990).
95. See, e.g., In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978). See also
United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d at 962 (request to have prosecutors instruct
grand jurors to disregard publicity); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 209 (5th Cir.
1980) (instruction to prosecutor to caution grand jurors not to disclose information; also, request to
instruct grand jurors to disregard publicity).
97. See, eg., United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 311 (Ist Cir. 1989) (court warned
prosecutors that it expected them to comply with Department of Justice policy requiring that a
target of the grand jury investigation be warned before testifying before the grand jury; court also
said that future violations of the policy would be referred to the Department of Justice for discipli-
nary action); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d at 210 (when defendant first raised the claim
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cution to present identified evidence to the grand jury, an equitable rem-
edy appropriate when the complaint is the failure to provide exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury.9 8 If the prosecutor has a conflict of interest,
the court can disqualify that prosecutor from participating in the grand
jury investigation.99
Although generally skeptical of remedies that intrude too much into
the grand jury's investigation, not all courts have foreclosed the possibil-
ity of equitable relief."oo In cases in which grand jury abuse is identified
early in the process, courts should recognize that, in most instances, re-
lief will be unavailable later on, and therefore they must invoke their
equitable authority to address the problem at an early stage. Even a lim-
ited judicial response to a claim of abuse may prompt prosecutorial com-
pliance with the rules.
B. Appellate Review
Appellate review is crucial to supervision for two reasons.10 1 First,
that grand jury secrecy had been breached, the court "reiterated its intent to enforce the provisions
of Rule 6(e) and suggested that the Justice Department attorneys again inform their superiors that
they should maintain the confidentiality of the material presented to the grand jury ... ").
98. See, eg., In re Application of Wood, 833 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1987); O'Bryan v. Chandler,
352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966); In re Grand Jury 89-2, 728 F. Supp.
1269 (E.D. Va. 1990).
99. Cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 873 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
100. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. Appellate review is important to the criminal process. The appellate courts are obligated to
"judicially supervise the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts which implies the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure." Supreme Court Review,
supra note 8, at 1038 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942)). In addition,
thorough appellate review of the application of supervisory power and the harmless error doctrine is
imperative in order to "achieve a balance between judicial efficiency and judicial integrity." Id. at
1063. Judicial review is both necessary and beneficial for furthering the aims of democracy and,
according to Judge Learned Hand, must be inferred from the Constitution. Johnson, Two Hundred
Years of Judicial Review: Delivering the Promise of America, 9 GEo. MASON U.L. REv. 223, 225-30
(1987) (citation omitted).
Regarding the application of judicial review to the grand jury, "[tihe use of self-restraint, the
existence of higher court review, and a defined standard of application will ensure the independence
of the grand jury and the prosecutor." Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers, supra note 3, at
1097. The Supreme Court has utilized its supervisory power to safeguard the criminal process in the
lower courts in order to "promote the search for the truth, to protect the integrity of the courts, to
remedy violations of individual rights, and to impose sanctions against governmental misconduct."
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1455 (1984).
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appellate review encourages the district court to take its supervisory re-
sponsibility seriously. Any attempt to invoke protection against grand
jury abuse disrupts the process, inconveniences the prosecutor, and
places the district court in the uncomfortable position of determining
whether to permit the petitioner to pursue the claim in the face of
prosecutorial assertions that the requested relief would unduly disrupt
the grand jury. In light of these difficulties, district courts may be in-
clined, if possible, to slough off claims of grand jury abuse. Whether the
lower courts can avoid scrutiny of claims of grand jury abuse depends in
large part on whether the petitioner will have a forum in which to chal-
lenge the district court's response to the claim. Procedural protections in
the grand jury will be more meaningful if they benefit from the watchful
eye of the appellate court.1"2
Second, the appellate courts define the law by which the district courts
are bound. If meaningful appellate review is unavailable, the protections
are unlikely to be defined or enforced uniformly.103 The lower courts can
therefore identify violations or reject allegations of violations without the
accountability that attends appellate review. Thus, the prosecution will
receive less guidance concerning what conduct is unacceptable in the
grand jury. If the appellate courts do not have to address claims of grand
jury abuse, and if the lower courts can dispose of such allegations on the
ground that, regardless of whether the behavior was improper, it clearly
did not have the required impact on the grand jury, then the courts are
likely to bypass consideration of the propriety of specific alleged miscon-
duct. Even when remedies are hard to obtain, an opinion condemning
the prosecutor's behavior in the grand jury can act as a caution to other
prosecutors and will define the standards of conduct to which they
should aspire. If appellate review is unavailable, the lower courts are less
likely to give this guidance. Behavior in the grand jury will depend on
the prosecution's sense of the appropriate procedural rules. Thus, the
102. Note, Appealability of Orders Relating to Ongoing Grand Jury Proceedings: In re April 1977
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 92 HARV. L. REv. 931 (1979).
103. For example, courts continue to treat failure to present material, exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury as an abuse warranting remedy. The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue,
and it is not entirely clear that failure to present exculpatory evidence is an abuse.
Another unresolved question concerns the use of immunity. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, the Court did not review claims that the prosecution had violated Rule 6 and had improperly
granted "pocket immunity." Because the alleged errors did not affect the decision of the grand jury
to indict, the Court did not address whether the prosecution had engaged in improper practices. 487
U.S. 250, 261-62 (1988).
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Court's restriction of appellate review further diminishes the possibility
of meaningful supervision.
There are three potential avenues to judicial review of a district court's
ruling: a writ of mandamus, interlocutory appeal, and post-conviction
review. Mandamus has always been difficult to obtain. Mechanik and
Midland Asphalt enhance barriers to interlocutory appeal and post-con-
viction review for many complaints of grand jury abuse. Generally,
claims that bear on the screening function of the grand jury will now
receive appellate review only if the government appeals the dismissal of
an indictment. Thus, the government will control which questions of
misconduct are presented to the appellate courts, and therefore, avoid
negative appellate precedent condemning certain conduct as improper.
The writ of mandamus has been defined as a drastic remedy that
should be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances. 1° Mandamus
review is sometimes available in criminal proceedings. However, due to
the final judgment rule and the general prohibition against piecemeal ap-
peals, it is doubtful that a court will issue the writ to correct improprie-
ties in grand jury proceedings."'5 Courts have denied requests for
mandamus review of grand jury proceedings in the overwhelming major-
ity of cases. Many of these cases involve orders denying motions to
quash grand jury subpoenas," in which the petitioner has access to the
normal remedy of contempt and appeal. In the few cases in which a
mandamus has been issued in the context of grand jury proceedings, the
court found extraordinary circumstances to exist; either the petitioner
was without a remedy or the lower court had abused its discretion."'
Interlocutory appeals are disfavored in all contexts. Not surprisingly,
the courts discourage interlocutory appeals from rulings on grand jury
104. Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
105. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967) (general policy against piecemeal appeals
takes on added weight in a criminal case, and the writ may never be employed as a substitute for
appeal in derogation of this policy). See also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940) (no
less important to safeguard against undue interruption of grand jury inquiry than trial after
indictment).
106. See WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 263-64 (1976).
107. See, e.g., In re Oswalt, 607 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1979) (extraordinary circumstances found to
exist where the district court had authorized federal agents to seize petitioner's documents before he
would have the chance to assert a fifth amendment privilege claim by the normal route of contempt
and appeal); In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) (mandamus review is appropriate way
to challenge alleged errors or abuses of discretion on the part of district judges in dealing with grand
jury investigations).
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matters. 10 8 In Midland Asphalt, the Court defined the limited class of
orders which are appealable as final collateral orders. To fall within the
class, an order must satisfy three criteria: It must "conclusively deter-
mine the disputed question"; it must "resolve an important issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action"; and it must be "effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 10 9
The one type of grand jury matter traditionally subject to interlocutory
appeal is the entry of a contempt order against a witness who has refused
to provide information to the grand jury. Thus, lower court rulings on
claims of privilege have generally been subject to prompt appellate re-
view. The witness' claim of privilege is separate from the merits of the
grand jury investigation.
Courts have traditionally relegated other types of grand jury abuse to
post-conviction review. In the courts' view, the trial will not harm the
defendant's protected interests, so society's interest should not suffer the
delay of interlocutory appeal. Mechanik, however, eliminated post-con-
viction review for at least some claims of grand jury abuse; the guilty
verdict rendered the grand jury error harmless and, consequently, nonre-
viewable.110 Defendants responded to Mechanik by pressing for interloc-
utory review of rulings on grand jury abuse. Defendants argued that the
harmless error rule of Mechanik makes post-conviction review meaning-
less and that, therefore, the defendant should be entitled immediately to
appeal an adverse ruling.
In Midland Asphalt, the Court rejected that argument. Without defin-
ing the character of the alleged violation in Midland Asphalt-a breach
of rule 6(e) secrecy-the Court held that, unless the rule violated was so
basic that it gave the defendant a "right not to be tried," appeal was
108. See also United States v. Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1638 (1989). See generally Note, supra note 102; Note, In Re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas:
Appealability of Orders Denying Disqualification of Grand Jury Prosecutors, 65 VA. L. REV. 573
(1979).
109. Midland Asphalt, 109 S. Ct at 1497 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978)).
110. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 73.
In United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 533 (1988), the
court remarked concerning Mechanik :
So it would be silly to reverse a conviction on the ground that the evidence before the grand
jury was insufficient. We know that this defendant is not a member of the class that is
harmed by sloppy or overbearing conduct before the grand jury. We know that he could
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inappropriate.111  The Court pointed out that if the violation was not
subject to the Mechanik rule, post-conviction review would be available.
If the violation was subject to the Mechanik rule, it was because the pur-
pose of the rule allegedly violated is to avoid indictment in the absence of
probable cause, and therefore, the matter is not adequately separate from
the merits of the action. 1 2
Through its rulings in Mechanik and Midland Asphalt, the Court has
broken grand jury rules into three categories for purposes of determining
access to interlocutory appeal: 1) rules that protect against indictment in
the absence of probable cause-the Mechanik rule; 2) rules which are so
fundamental that the defendant has a right not to be tried; and 3) rules
that are not so fundamental as to raise a right not to be tried, but which
serve some purpose other than the protection against indictment in the
absence of probable cause. 3 Only violations of the small category of
fundamental rules will be subject to interlocutory appeal." 4 When
Mechanik applies, interlocutory appeal is not allowed. When a rule falls
in the third category, the defendant is not entitled to dismissal of the
indictment, and therefore, interlocutory appeal during the criminal pro-
cess is not an issue. The allegation of abuse should be addressed in a
separate proceeding that may generate an appealable order.
The assumption that grand jury violations could be raised after convic-
tion underlies many of the decisions barring interlocutory appeal of rul-
ings on grand jury matters. That assumption can no longer be regarded
as valid in light of the Court's recent decisions. 5 Whether Mechanik
and Midland Asphalt foreclose review of violations of other rules of
grand jury procedure depends on how the Court defines the purposes of
11I. Midland Asphalt, 109 S. Ct. at 1499.
112. Midland Asphalt, 109 S. Ct. at 1498. See also United States v. Sherlock, 887 F.2d 971 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Moreno-Green, 881 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying the same alterna-
tive reasoning to reject interlocutory appeal of claims of grand jury abuse).
113. In United States v. Howard, 867 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1989), defendant's claim that she was
the victim of a "perjury trap" challenged the validity of the criminal action itself rather than merely
alleging prosecutorial misconduct in the indictment process. The court compared the violation of
the rights asserted by the defendant with violations of vindictive or selective prosecution. Id. at 552.
Since the claim raises issues of fundamental fairness, the Mechanik harmless error rule will not bar
post-conviction review of defendant's claim. Id. The court held that the trial court's rejection of the
claim that a "pejury trap" induced defendant to make false statements before the grand jury is not
subject to interlocutory appeal.
114. See United States v. Sherlock, 887 F.2d at 973; United States v. Moreno-Green, 881 F.2d at
684; United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1989); Comment, supra note 8, at 280-83
(discussing which violations might be deemed fundamental).
115. See Midland Asphalt, 109 S. CL at 1494.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
920 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:885
those rules." 6 The holding in Mechanik rested on the Court's assess-
ment that Rule 6(d) "protects against the danger that a defendant will be
required to defend against a charge for which there is no probable cause
to believe him guilty.""1 7 If other protections at the grand jury stage are
similarly perceived as enhancing the grand jury's shield function, but
only as protection against indictment on insufficient evidence, then post-
indictment review of those violations will likewise be foreclosed.
A number of lower courts have evaluated other grand jury errors to
determine whether the harmless error rule of Mechanik applies. 1 8 Some
courts have applied a narrow interpretation of Mechanik and have
viewed other grand jury violations as significantly different from the
technical violation of Rule 6(d) raised in Mechanik. As a result, these
courts have held that the other significantly different violations may not
be washed away by a guilty verdict returned by a petit jury.1 19 Other
courts have read Mechanik more broadly.12 0
In light of Midland Asphalt 1 and Bank of Nova Scotia, however,
much of the lower courts' discussion is misdirected. The Court has made
116. See generally Note, supra note 7, at 1268-69.
117. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
118. See infra notes 119-120. Most of the courts considered the question before the Supreme
Court's decision in Midland Asphalt in an attempt to determine the impact of Mechanik on the
defendant's right to interlocutory appeal.
119. See, eg., United States v. Kramer, 864 F.2d 99, 101 (11th Cir. 1988) (post-conviction re-
view of motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum due to alleged prosecutorial abuse not precluded by
Mechanik); United States v. Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216, 219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mechanik would not
foreclose post-conviction review of alleged Rule 6(e) secrecy violation); United States v. Johns, 858
F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1988) (post-conviction review of claims of failure to present exculpatory evidence
and Rule 6(e) violations available); United States v. Larouche Campaign, 829 F.2d 250 (1st Cir.
1987) (post-conviction review available for alleged abuse of grand jury to investigate a pending in-
dictment, Rule 6(e) violations, and other persistent and pervasive patterns of grand jury abuse);
United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1986) (distinction between a right not to stand
accused except upon a finding of probable cause and a broader right to fundamental fairness
throughout the criminal process suggests that Mechanik does not preclude post-conviction review
for alleged prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury).
120. See, eg., United States v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir.) (harmless error applies when
grand jury foreman was not qualified to serve), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); United States v.
Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988) (people harmed by grand jury abuse are the innocent; there-
fore, once a person is convicted, courts can be confident that a full presentation to the grand jury
would have resulted in a valid indictment); United States v. McKie, 831 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1987)
(harmless error rule applies to prosecutorial misconduct such as improper statements made to the
grand jury); United States v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987) (harmless error applies to
prosecutorial misconduct such as harassing witnesses, presenting irrelevant and false, prejudicial
evidence, and abusing the grand jury's subpoena authority).
121. Midland Asphalt, 109 S. Ct. at 1498.
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it clear that if the rule violated is directed at something other than the
shield function of the grand jury, the matter is collateral to the criminal
trial; dismissal is not an appropriate remedy, and the defendant can be
required to stand trial and seek relief from the grand jury abuse outside
that context. The question of appeal after conviction is significant only
when dismissal might be an appropriate remedy. Dismissal is an appro-
priate remedy only for two categories of grand jury violations-viola-
tions of rules designed to protect against indictment when there is no
probable cause, and violations of fundamental rules.122 The former are
almost certainly subject to the harmless error rule. The latter are not,
but the Court's definition of fundamental protection in this context seems
extremely narrow.
Thus, appellate review of claims of grand jury abuse is severely re-
stricted. Appellate review of claimed violations of rules designed to pre-
serve the shield function of the grand jury is now generally unavailable.
Denials of equitable relief should be reviewable as collateral orders,
although it is highly doubtful that an aggrieved party would be able to
obtain appellate review of a decision not to sanction a prosecutor for
grand jury abuse. Of course, a denial of a motion to suppress would be
appealable only after the verdict in the case, at which point the signifi-
cance of the evidence admitted would be evaluated to determine whether
the error, if any, was harmful.
IV. THE DEMISE OF THE SHIELD FUNCTION
Can it any longer be claimed that the grand jury functions as a shield
against improper indictment? The answer is clearly "no." The Court
has ruled out any meaningful protection against indictment on the basis
of unreliable, even false, evidence. A grand jury may indict on evidence
that is incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading. The presentation of unreli-
able evidence would seem as great a threat as any to the grand jury's
ability to shield against unwarranted indictments. Nevertheless, the
weight of precedent has always run against protecting defendants from
the presentation of unreliable evidence. While some lower courts have
exercised their supervisory authority to dismiss indictments because the
prosecution presented false testimony, misleading evidence, or deceptive
hearsay evidence, the majority of courts have consistently declined to
122. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256-57.
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exercise supervisory authority in that manner. 123
Despite most courts' reticence to exercise their authority to protect
against unreliable evidence, the practice was common enough that prose-
cutors had an incentive to be cautious in their choice and presentation of
evidence. In Bank of Nova Scotia, however, the Court made it clear that
dismissal of the indictment is not an appropriate response to the mere
presentation of inaccurate evidence, even though that presentation
prejudiced the defendant. Bank of Nova Scotia thus eliminates any rem-
edy for the presentation of inaccurate evidence and forecloses the exer-
cise of supervisory authority to curtail the grand jury's reliance on
unreliable evidence.
In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court recognized its traditional unwilling-
ness to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence on which the grand jury
based the decision to indict and took that unwillingness one step further.
In so doing, the Court relied on Costello v. United States.1 24 In Costello,
the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment because the grand jury
had heard only hearsay evidence. The defendant argued unsuccessfully
that the indictment did not provide the protection guaranteed by the fifth
amendment.
The significance of the Costello decision was not clear. The prosecu-
tion presented hearsay as the only feasible means of establishing a tax
violation through a net worth theory, but the evidence presented was
substantial and reliable. Yet the Costello Court expressed its holding in
language beyond that called for by the defendant's argument or the facts
of the case. The Court stated: "An indictment returned by a legally con-
stituted and unbiased grand jury, ... if valid on its face, is enough to call
for trial of the charge on the merits." '25 The Court declined to adopt the
standard advanced by Justice Burton, who argued that an indictment
should be quashed "if it is shown that the grand jury had before it no
substantial or rationally persuasive evidence... "126 The Court, in Cos-
tello, sought to avoid the prospect of a pretrial hearing on the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the indictment in every case. Unfortunately,
the Court's language is broad enough to foreclose all challenges based on
the quantity or quality of the evidence presented.
123. The best solution to this problem would undoubtedly be legislative action. See Arenella,
supra note 4. Unfortunately, legislative measures have not been forthcoming.
124. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
125. Id. at 363.
126. Id. at 364.
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The Costello Court's refusal to consider any challenge to the evidence
underlying an indictment received criticism from both courts and com-
mentators. Although some courts adhered to the full import of the deci-
sion's language, 27 others avoided Costello, distinguishing it on its facts
from cases in which the evidence before the grand jury was inaccurate or
unreliable. 28 Because the holding in Costello was narrow, these courts
invoked their supervisory authority or the constitutional protection of
the defendant from trial without indictment to dismiss indictments based
on unreliable, false, or misleading evidence.
In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court eliminated the arguments that had
led courts to protect against unreliable evidence in the grand jury. The
Court squelched the speculation that Costello was no longer good law
and continued beyond the narrow holding of Costello. The Court held
that even a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the govern-
127. See United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984) (indictment which is valid on its
face and returned by unbiased jury would not be dismissed even in light of government's withholding
of exculpatory evidence and its use of perjured testimony), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United
States v. Schlesinger, 598 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.) (superseding indictment valid on its face so court cannot
consider the adequacy of the evidence supporting it even though prosecution's summary of prior
grand jury testimony was hearsay), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979); United States v. Ruyle, 524
F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1975) (withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury is not grounds for
dismissing indictment), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422 (10th
Cir. 1972) (court cannot look behind an indictment which is valid upon its face to determine whether
it is based on adequate evidence); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082 (D.N.H. 1981)
(indictment based upon hearsay testimony is not invalid), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 842 (1984); United
States v. Reilly, 456 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (indictment based upon hearsay evidence is not
invalid), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Costello holding in
recent decisions prior to Bank of Nova Scotia. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974);
United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
128. See United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1982) (when perjured testimony is
discovered before trial, government has option of withdrawing the tainted indictment and seeking a
new one based upon untainted evidence, or, in the alternative, an in camera judicial hearing to
determine sufficiency of the other evidence will be held); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing indictment due to intentional suppression of favorable testimony); United
States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing conviction due to the denial of due process
when government allowed defendant to stand trial on indictment which it knew was based in part
upon perjured testimony); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissing indict-
ment when the two witnesses who were in best position to inform grand jury of what occurred prior
and subsequent to arrest were not called before grand jury and sole witness was police officer who
had limited personal knowledge of events and grand jury was not informed of this lack of personal
knowledge); United States v. Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968) (indictment based solely upon
hearsay would not be set aside because defendants were not prejudiced; it was inconceivable that
grand jury would have refused to indict based upon the other evidence presented); Jones v. United
States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (remanding case to district court to determine if untainted
evidence, other than illegally obtained confessions, supported the grand jury's indictment).
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ment's inaccurate and misleading summaries presented immediately
prior to the grand jury's deliberation and vote did not warrant dismissal,
absent at least a showing of knowing prosecutorial misconduct. 129 Bank
of Nova Scotia thus substantially curtailed the authority-never clear,
but relied upon by some lower courts-to exercise supervisory authority
to control the quality of the evidence on which grand juries indict.
Bank of Nova Scotia leaves open one avenue of attack. Different con-
cerns, which are taken more seriously by the Court, are brought into play
if prosecutors intentionally mislead the grand jury. In Bank of Nova Sco-
tia, the Court noted that the record did not support a finding that the
prosecutors knew the evidence was false or caused the agents to present
false evidence. 130 Thus, a defendant whose indictment is based on false
or misleading information presented to the grand jury may be able to
obtain relief if the defendant can demonstrate that the prosecutors had
knowledge of the false or misleading information. That avenue is nar-
row, however. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the district court found that,
"[u]nbeknown to the grand jurors, the government attorneys contempo-
raneously entertained serious doubts as to the accuracy of certain critical
'facts' contained in the summaries." '131 Doubts, the Supreme Court held,
are not enough; the defendant must establish knowledge. This eviden-
tiary hurdle is substantial. 32
Furthermore, even the defendant who proves knowing presentation of
false evidence may not be able to persuade the court to dismiss the indict-
ment. The defendant may have to persuade the court that the false evi-
dence meets some standard of materiality. An argument could be made
that knowingly misleading the grand jury is misconduct so serious that
the indictment should be dismissed, even in the absence of prejudice, to
protect the criminal justice process. However, the Court has been un-
receptive to that argument in the trial setting. In a criminal trial, know-
ing presentation of false testimony is not automatically a basis for
reversal of the conviction obtained. 3 The Court has held that due pro-
cess mandates a new trial if the false testimony could "in any reasonable
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." '134 The standard fa-
129. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 260.
130. Id. at 261.
131. United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1340 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456
(10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
132. See, eg., United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1989).
133. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
134. Id. at 677 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
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vors a new trial because the knowing use of perjured testimony involves
both prosecutorial misconduct and the corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process.
In its opinions addressing the appropriate response to the withholding
of exculpatory information, the Court's primary emphasis has been on
the truth-seeking aspect of the trial and the fact-finding fairness of the
proceeding, not on the deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct or the pro-
ceeding's procedural fairness. 3 ' The Court may be expected to adopt a
similar approach to the presentation of false information to the grand
jury. It seems unlikely that the Court will treat knowing presentation of
inaccurate evidence as per se grounds for dismissal of an indictment.
Rather, the Court is more likely to demand a finding of prejudice to the
defendant.
In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court defined the prejudice a defendant
must demonstrate to obtain dismissal of an indictment on grounds of
nonconstitutional error. The defendant must show that the error was a
substantial influence on the grand jury's decision to indict.136 Thus, the
defendant seeking pretrial relief from grand jury error bears the burden
of establishing the impact of the error on the grand jury's process. Rely-
ing on the analogy to the exculpatory evidence decisions, the Court
should dismiss an indictment if the defendant establishes knowing pres-
entation of false evidence by the prosecutor and establishes a reasonable
likelihood the false or misleading evidence influenced the grand jury's
decision to indict.137 The knowing presentation of false evidence is
prosecutorial misconduct that threatens the independence of the grand
jury, arguably violating the defendant's right to indictment by a grand
jury under the fifth amendment. As in the criminal trial, the conduct
should be treated as constitutional error if the defendant can show it is
reasonably likely that the false evidence had an impact on the process. If
135. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976). There are two positions concerning the prosecutor's duty to reveal exculpatory evidence.
See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987) (when substantial exculpatory evidence is
discovered during investigation, prosecutor has duty to reveal it to grand jury). But see United
States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 937-38 (6th Cir. 1984) (no duty to reveal exculpatory evidence
discovered during investigation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
136. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 259.
137. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987) (indictment may be dismissed only
if the prosecutorial misconduct is so flagrant that it significantly infringes on the grand jury's
independence).
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the defendant can establish prejudice in this way, the indictment should
be dismissed.
There may be an additional barrier to relief based on the prosecutor's
knowing presentation of false or misleading evidence to the grand jury.
If the defendant is convicted at trial, the Court may view the error as
harmless. In both Mechanik 138 and Midland,139 the Court held that a
violation of a grand jury rule designed to protect against improper indict-
ment would be harmless if the defendant was convicted on sufficient evi-
dence at trial. On the other hand, the Court has held that constitutional
error in the selection of the grand jury is not harmless. While the Court
has had no occasion to consider whether Mechanik's harmless error rule
applies to other constitutional errors in the grand jury process, there is
no reason to doubt that the violation would be deemed harmless if
viewed after conviction at trial.
In the decisions concerning exculpatory evidence and false testimony
at trial, the Court has declined to link the relief awarded to the wrongful-
ness of the prosecutor's conduct. Instead, the Court has held that, re-
gardless of how wrongful the prosecution's conduct, the defendant
establishes a constitutional violation only by demonstrating the likeli-
hood that the wrong affected the accuracy of the fact-finding process to
the defendant's detriment. If false or misleading testimony is presented
to the grand jury, but is not presented at trial, and the evidence presented
at trial is sufficient to support the conviction, the accuracy of the trial as
a fact-finding process is untainted by the grand jury violation. Thus,
there is no on-going harm to the defendant that warrants relief.
If, indeed, the Court applies this harmless error analysis to constitu-
tional grand jury violations, the defendant faces a practical problem that
renders supervision of the grand jury through this avenue almost mean-
ingless. The defendant will rarely be able to establish the grand jury vio-
lation until after the trial has commenced. Often, the defendant has no
way to discover the presentation of false or misleading evidence until the
mid-trial discovery of witness' transcripts is disclosed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500.X40
A pretrial order to turn over all transcripts of proceedings before the
grand jury, such as that in Bank of Nova Scotia, is extremely unusual.
More typically, before the trial stage, the defense has very little informa-
138. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70-71.
139. Midland Asphalt, 109 S. Ct. at 1498.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1985).
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tion regarding the grand jury proceedings. Witnesses friendly to the de-
fense may provide information, but usually know only what happened
during their grand jury appearances. Otherwise, the defense receives
only what the government is willing to provide; grand jury transcripts
are not included in the items that must be disclosed in pretrial discovery.
The defense gains access only to the grand jury transcripts during trial,
but only for those witnesses who testify at the trial.141
Thus, the defendant is unlikely to have the basis for a pretrial motion
to dismiss on the ground that the prosecutor intentionally misled the
grand jury. The first opportunity to move for dismissal will be midtrial,
at which time it is likely to be deferred until post-trial. At that point, the
motion is irrelevant. A conviction renders the error harmless; an acquit-
tal moots the question. Only a mistrial or a successful motion for a new
trial would leave the case in a posture that would warrant a motion to
dismiss based on the evidence of misconduct revealed at trial.
What this analysis suggests is that the Court is doing more than
merely turning its back on problems of unreliable evidence upon which
an indictment is based. The Court is also establishing a framework
within which serious misconduct by the prosecutor in the grand jury-
the knowing presentation of false or misleading evidence-is likely to go
unredressed. The Court's approach to unreliable evidence precludes ex-
ercise of the supervisory authority to ensure that the grand jury respon-
sibly executes its shield function.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has conveyed the message that ef-
forts to supervise the grand jury are not welcome. It has placed the
strongest sanctions for abuse off limits and has directed the lower courts
to restrict their exercise of supervisory authority. The courts and legisla-
ture must explore options for exerting supervision over the grand jury. If
the enforceable rules do not assure its function as a shield, then its consti-
tutional footing must be questioned. If it can be abused with impunity as
a sword, it represents an intolerable hazard. Little can be done at this
stage to give substance to the grand jury's shield role, but the courts and
legislature must restrict its potential for abuse as the prosecutor's sword.
141. The prosecution ordinarily has no obligation to disclose the grand jury transcript of a wit-
ness who does not appear at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. In fact, the defense may not even get the
entire grand jury testimony of a witness who does testify at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Kouba,
632 F. Supp. 937 (D.N.D. 1986).
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